The Tweaks Behind Manchester United's Resurgence

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§ 01PLAYING OUT OF THE BACK (C'EST QUOI?)

Playing out from the back is an in-possession principle where teams initiate possession sequences from their defensive third using short passes rather than clearing the ball long and contesting for second balls. Teams employ this approach for several reasons:

1. To maintain control of the ball by limiting long balls and second ball instances 2. To create artificial transitions after luring the opponent

Maintaining Control

Winning second balls remains one of the more unpredictable aspects of the modern game. To maintain control, teams choose to play short where they can more likely control the following action, rather than play a long ball and risk losing the second ball.

Artificial Transitions

Artificial transitions occur when a team in settled possession creates a transition-like state by inducing the opposition to lose their settled defensive structure. Essentially, teams bait the opposition press while playing out from the back, then breaking the lines—through ball carrying, long balls over the press, or patient passing—to create counter-attack situations.

§ 02Ten Hag's Flexibility on Build-Up Play

Ten Hag had his Ajax side play out from the back. However, he is flexible about how this is accomplished. After the Brentford defeat, he noted: "I don't want to play out from the back when it is not possible. It is naive how we played today."

He emphasized that when space exists high on the pitch with free men available, United should be more direct rather than persisting with short passing patterns.

§ 03Issues at Brentford

United made several turnovers in their defensive third against Brentford. In one instance, De Gea received the ball with poor body shape—neither allowing the ball to roll across him sufficiently nor taking a positive touch to reset. He found himself in a closed stance with limited angle and range, making his pass to Christian Eriksen easy to read and intercept.

Ten Hag had deployed Eriksen as the deepest midfielder and primary recipient during build-up, similar to his use of Frenkie de Jong at Ajax. However, while Eriksen possesses problem-solving composure in deeper midfield, he lacks the acceleration and ball-carrying ability to flip defensive situations into attacking ones.

§ 04ALTERATIONS TO UNITED'S APPROACH TO BUILD-UP

After Brighton and Brentford, United reverted to a longer, more direct style from the back, ditching previous attempts to play out from the back. They also started utilizing second balls to progress the ball—ironically similar to approaches employed by Brighton and Brentford to exploit their vulnerable defense.

Data shows a significant increase in long balls attempted by De Gea in recent games, indicating altered build-up tendencies. Progressive pass attempts concentrate especially from deep to wide areas.

Situation One: Coherent Wide Overloads

In some moments, the decision to play long was coherent. Central players held their positions rather than aggressively showing for the ball, and fullbacks pushed forward to create wide overloads, assist with second balls, and offer themselves as outlets. This represents a "chosen ball"—situations where players deliberately opt for long balls despite having time and space available.

Situation Two: Confusion and Lost Coverage

In other instances during the second half while preserving a lead, confusion existed in the backline about which pass type to play. This resulted in lost coverage for second balls. Dalot and McTominay raced toward the ball to provide short passing options, but De Gea had predetermined to launch it long, causing United to lose midfield compactness and become susceptible to counters.

Situation Three: Over-Cautious Long Clearance

De Gea received an unpressurized back-pass from Casemiro while United held a 3v1 advantage on the first line against Jamie Vardy. Casemiro signaled to calm down and retain possession, but De Gea cleared it long anyway. United were positioned to play out from the back comfortably, yet De Gea couldn't discern the situation and game state, launching the ball unnecessarily.

§ 05WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR TEN HAG'S INITIAL TACTICAL SCHEMES?

These recent changes stem from failed early recruitment, a poor season start, and altered recruitment strategy. Casemiro's signing has markedly changed structures in the first two phases from pre-season and early-season games—seemingly built with de Jong in mind.

Formation Evolution:

United trialed a 4-3-3 nominally with Fred as the deepest midfielder during pre-season and early season games. However, Ten Hag now appears to deploy a 4-2-3-1 formation in possession with a distinct attacking midfielder, at least during build-up phases.

This 4-2-3-1 shape mirrors Ten Hag's 2021/2022 Ajax side, featuring Edson Alvarez in the pivot role—a position now occupied by McTominay and eventually Casemiro.

Casemiro's Role:

The Brazilian will likely function as a transition diffuser in the pivot, tasked with breaking up plays and making first contact with aerials. His profile shows he is not overtly inclined to progress the ball—a tendency rather than an inability. Consequently, responsibility for guile and progression falls more on fullbacks and center-backs.

United might deploy a 3-2-5 build-up shape (with one fullback tucked in to form a back-three) while the ball remains in the second phase.

In the final third, few, if any, changes should occur to attacking and chance-creation dynamics.

These altered dynamics may strengthen United, though the full implications remain to be seen as the side adapts to Ten Hag's adjusted tactical setup.