*Written in Fall 2024 for [PHIL 381](https://catalog.ku.edu/liberal-arts-sciences/philosophy/#courseinventory) (Feminism and Philosophy)* --- In *Testimonial Injustice*, Miranda Fricker examines how identity power and prejudice influence the credibility assigned to an interlocutor, resulting in either a credibility deficit or excess. She defines testimonial injustice (TI) as credibility deficits rooted in identity prejudice.[^1] She asserts that ethical culpability – marked by “immoral hatefulness” – is necessary for TI.[^2] Fricker distinguishes epistemic culpability – misjudging a speaker’s credibility due to ignorance or laziness – from ethical culpability, which entails prejudice based on the speaker's social identity, such as their race, gender, or class.[^3] She then contends that regardless of the extent of a hearer’s epistemic culpability that leads to credibility deficit, it cannot account for a TI. Relevantly, Fricker justifies this exception only with non-testimonial examples. This paper will use Anita Hill’s 1991 testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee (SJC) during Clarence Thomas’s Supreme Court confirmation hearings to critique Fricker’s framework for diagnosing a TI. I will show how an assessment of systemic epistemic culpability by the SJC alone – even without corresponding assessment of identity prejudice – might be sufficient to meet her criteria for a TI.[^4] To begin, I will outline the premise of Anita’s testimony to suggest epistemic culpability by the SJC, who we will call the *primary hearer*. As part of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) vetting process, Hill was contacted regarding allegations of sexual harassment during her time working under Thomas. Hill provided a statement, which she says was requested by (a member of) the SJC, corroborating these allegations.[^5] Her statement was subsequently leaked to the public, leading to her being called to testify before the SJC. Despite this premise, and Hill’s reassertions during her opening statement, the SJC belabored Hill’s motivations for taking the stand, implying some (deliberate or “innocent”) ignorance. Hence, we can assign some epistemic culpability to the SJC – because they did not sufficiently ascertain the circumstances around which the testimony came to be. Now, let us briefly consider the ethical culpability of some *secondary hearers* – any party who was not part of the Senate and engaged with media surrounding the testimony proceedings. In *ANITA*, Hill substantiated her claims of receiving death threats and hate mail from *secondary hearers* – some of which targeted racial and sexual lines.[^6] While further, specific examination of evidence would be insightful, we can already deduce how this meets a TI. This simpler case is also not the focus of the essay – yet its confirmation is important to the larger thesis. Finally, by considering the constituted powers of the SJC, the response of the aforementioned *secondary hearers*, and Fricker’s own explanation of credibility excess, I will draw connections between epistemic failures at the institutional level and the nature of credibility judgments, hence TI, by *secondary hearers*. In a representative democracy, citizens — including *secondary hearers* — elect senators to act on their behalf and represent their interests. Consequently, senators bear specific legal and moral obligations to these secondary hearers, who, in turn, indirectly lend credibility (excess) and influence to the primary hearers. This dynamic imposes an ethical charge on the primary hearers. Within this framework, there is a compelling case to argue that, to the extent of their epistemic culpability, the SJC was ethically culpable to the *secondary hearers*. Moreover, the SJC’s inadequate appreciation of the circumstances that led Anita Hill to take the stand contributed to a broader ethical culpability among *secondary hearers*, who then perpetuated TI against Hill. --- **Notes** [^1]: Miranda Fricker, *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 28. [^2]: Ibid., 23. [^3]: Ibid. [^4]: For the sake of our assessment, we consider the SJC to be a singular body, an extension of the US Senate, bearing shared consequences and culpability for any member’s actions. [^5]: *ANITA: Speaking Truth to Power.* Directed by Freida Lee Mock. 2014. United States: Chanlim Films, American Film Foundation, and Sanders & Mock Productions. Streaming on Apple TV. [^6]: Ibid.